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Herb Simon (1996) begins the third chapter of The Sci-ences of the Artificial with a parable about an ant mak-ing her way home across a beach and comments that
the complexity of her route is not a manifestation of any
complex, goal-seeking behavior within the ant but rather
reflects the complexity of the environment. The ant “must
adapt [her] course repeatedly to the difficulties [she] encoun-
ters and often detour uncrossable barriers.” The question that
interests us is not whether the ant is complex, but whether
she should be considered an intelligent agent. The ant
appears to have a goal to get home, and she exhibits control
in her ability to navigate novel and complex terrain. Her con-
trol is grounded in a coupling of her perceptions to her
actions that keep her from continually bumping into an
obstacle. Nevertheless, calling the ant an intelligent agent
seems like overzealous anthropomorphism on our part. Why
is that?
Within the artificial intelligence (AI) community, this
question is not new. For decades AI researchers have built
agents that are capable of carrying out tasks that require
human-level or humanlike intelligence. During this time,
questions of how these programs compared in kind to
humans have surfaced and led to beneficial interdisciplinary
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There Is No Agency 
Without Attention
Paul F. Bello, Will Bridewell
n Over the decades, the view of agency
in artificial intelligence (AI) has nar-
rowed to one that emphasizes acting in
a way that maximizes reward. This per-
spective fails to make contact with the
broader academic and legal communi-
ties where agency is bound up with per-
sonal accountability. To explore this gap
in meaning, we introduce a spectrum of
control that characterizes standard
approaches to constructing agents and
points the way toward agents that can
be held responsible. The linchpin that
enables agents to control their actions in
the “right way” is attention. Broadly
construed, attention lets an agent that
is responsive to its environment consid-
er the relationships among its actions,
goals, and norms while also avoiding
distraction. This ability enables strate-
gic norm violations and opens the door
to artificial, human-level agency.
discussions, but conceptual progress has been slower
than technological progress. Over the past decade,
the term agency has taken on new import as intelli-
gent agents have become a noticeable part of our
everyday lives. Research on autonomous vehicles and
personal assistants has expanded into private indus-
try with new and increasingly capable products sur-
facing as a matter of routine. This wider use of AI
technologies has raised questions about legal and
moral agency at the highest levels of government
(National Science and Technology Council 2016) and
drawn the interest of other academic disciplines and
the general public. Within this context, the notion
of an intelligent agent in AI is too coarse and in need
of refinement. We suggest that the space of AI agents
can be subdivided into classes, where each class is
defined by an associated degree of control.
On this front, we can identify three categories of
agents based on differences in how control is mani-
fested given a number of factors. To a first approxi-
mation these factors include the agent’s ability to sys-
tematically cope with ignorance or indifference by
generating and evaluating hypotheticals and the
agent’s ability (1) to choose a course of action against
the background of explicit norms for action selection
and (2) to remain committed to that course in the
presence of ordinary distractions (Cohen and
Levesque 1990). In general, the three different class-
es of agents trend toward greater flexibility by being
less bound to peculiarities of the current situation
and less constrained by whichever principles deter-
mine action on a moment-to-moment basis. As we
give examples below, we will do our best to point out
differences in these dimensions.
Three Types of Agents
Agents of the first type have fixed representations of
their environment, including environmental uncer-
tainty. By this, we mean that an agent knows about all
the variables, objects, and events in its environment
and can effectively build a state space from this infor-
mation even if initial values for the variables are
unknown. Actions for this kind of agent are essential-
ly stimulus-response mappings that may be deter-
mined by hard-wired principles such as utility maxi-
mization, cost minimization, winner-take-all, or
through a fixed ordering scheme. In this case, control
involves keeping a known set of state variables with-
in legal ranges or responding to changes in state vari-
ables in specific ways. Canonical examples include a
home’s thermostat, a car’s cruise control, and an air-
plane’s autopilot system.
Agents of the second type are flexible in the face of
ignorance or indifference. Rather than being able to
represent only what they know to be the case given
background knowledge, they can generate what
might be the case hypothetically and can respond to
evaluations of those hypotheticals. Consider a deer
when thirst drives her to drink from a stream and the
smell of a bear drives her to run to the forest.
Whether she drinks or flees depends on interactions
among several internal and external factors, includ-
ing her calculated distance to refuge (Stankowich and
Blumstein 2005). Importantly, there is flexibility
based on which of those factors draw her attention
(Bernays and Wcislo 1994). While the action-deter-
mining principles used by the second type of agent
may not differ in kind from those used in the first
type, the generation of hypotheticals dynamically
expands the state space and enables a measure of
control otherwise unattainable.
Agents of the third type are capable of committing
to choices with respect to norms. The defining char-
acteristic of norms is that they specify what an agent
ought to do rather than determining what an agent
actually does. Explicitly represented norms can sub-
sume the sort of fixed principles that determine the
actions taken by the agents of the first and second
types. So while those two types of agents unfailingly
act in ways that maximize utility or minimize cost,
agents of the third type have these principles encod-
ed explicitly. This explicit encoding makes the norms
available for reasoning, comparison, and interchange
based on the dynamics of the situation. Considered
as a norm rather than hard-wired mechanisms, cost
minimization might be violated in light of circum-
stances in which the expected costs of performing
various actions are unknown whereas the expected
utilities of potential outcomes are well characterized.
Similarly, there may be situations in which the utili-
ties of two different actions are incommensurate,
such as when one of the actions has moral signifi-
cance and the other is driven by self interest. For
instance, a hungry man who forgot his wallet may be
inclined to take a sandwich from a shop counter. In
this situation, he may satisfy his hunger without
much thought, he may recall his morals that prohib-
it stealing and opt to walk away, or he may choose to
violate or reinterpret his moral code and steal the
sandwich.
Along with their actions being guided by explicit
norms, agents of the third type commit themselves
to pursuing their goals in the face of distractions, sit-
uational reappraisals, and so on. Such an agent might
have any number of opportunities to abandon its
longer-terms plans in favor of a shorter-term oppor-
tunity for gain, or it may find goal pursuit stymied by
distracting stimuli.1 A committed agent must have
mechanisms that allow it to remain focused on goal
pursuit so as to avoid vacillation. We claim that these
focusing mechanisms and the ability to use norms in
action selection are both necessary conditions for
human-level agency.
What kind of mechanisms could plausibly account
for differences between all three types of agent? Our
answers are attention and control of attention. Before
we discuss attention and its role in control, we
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and control that led us to propose the particular tax-
onomy sketched in this introduction. As we progress,
we find that a rich capacity for agency imposes cer-
tain demands on the design of cognitive systems. By
the end of our discussion, we anticipate that the read-
er will agree with our claim that there is no agency
without attention, and that a rich account of attention
ought to be at the heart of any cognitive system that
aims to exhibit human-level agency.
What Is Agency?
In the first AAAI Presidential Address, Allen Newell
spoke at length about intelligent agents. In the pub-
lished version of his lecture he wrote, 
… an agent is composed of a set of actions, a set of
goals and a body … the agent processes its knowledge
to determine the actions to take … the behavior law is
the principle of rationality. Actions are selected to
attain the agent’s goals (Newell 1981, p. 6). 
With an emphasis on the interactions among knowl-
edge, goals, and actions, Newell’s knowledge-level
perspective continues to inspire researchers in cogni-
tive systems. For comparison, the last 20 years has
seen the broader AI community treating a rational
agent as one that “for each possible percept sequence
… should select an action that is expected to maxi-
mize its performance measure, given the evidence
provided by the percept sequence and whatever
built-in knowledge the agent has” (Russell and
Norvig 2002, p. 36). This emphasis on maximization
conflicts with interdisciplinary and nontechnical
views on agency in a way that Newell’s treatment
does not, but neither perspective captures the rich-
ness of agency as it is broadly understood.
Consider first the definition from Russell and
Norvig. For them, a rational agent should be built to
act unfailingly in the right way, given all its knowl-
edge. This implies that agents of this sort can act only
on the information they have, which may include
representations of known uncertainty. Maximization
or minimization principles require complete charac-
terization of the state of the world. However, there
are many cases where action must be taken in the
absence of information — when uncertainty cannot
be quantified or when an agent’s environmental
model fails. In such cases, clear preferences among
alternatives may never have been learned or may not
be possible to uncover.
Other situations raise concerns for both Russell
and Norvig’s and Newell’s accounts of agency. Sup-
pose that a person gets up, puts on their clothes,
drives to their in-laws’ house, grabs a knife from the
kitchen, stabs their mother-in-law to death, and then
drives to the police station claiming to have killed
someone. On this description, we would say the per-
son is not only an intelligent agent but also a moral
agent, one who can bear responsibility for their
actions (see Scheutz [2017]).2 Now, imagine that
same scenario but where the person involved was
somnambulant, carrying out the actions while
asleep. This suggestion may sound like a philoso-
pher’s game, but somnambulant assaults and homi-
cides are well documented. The aforementioned
sketch roughly corresponds to the case of Kenneth
Parks (Broughton et al. 1994) whose acquittal from
homicide was upheld under appeal. The legal argu-
ment was that Parks exhibited noninsane automa-
tism, which requires the offending action(s) to be
unconscious and involuntary.3 Parks’s ability to drive
a car, search for a knife, and attack his in-laws sug-
gests that he was an intelligent agent, but something
was missing from his experience that prevented him
from being a moral agent.
What do the accounts of agency presented above
have to say regarding this example? The answer,
unfortunately, is, “not much.” Neither Russell and
Norvig’s nor Newell’s definition can distinguish
between the normal and somnambulent versions of
the homicide story. Agents as defined by both views
lack the ability to “act otherwise” — their actions are
inherently unconscious and involuntary. In contrast,
agents who choose to act do so (typically) voluntari-
ly and consciously. If the sleepwalker, who is
unaware of his actions and unable to veto them, is
not accountable, then neither is any form of AI agent
that fails to distinguish between or provide some
analogue to conscious and unconscious content.
Similarly, an agent cannot be held accountable if it
lacks reliable mechanisms capable of bringing its
behavior in line with its consciously considered
desires, obligations, and the like.
Does this mean that the development of artificial,
accountable, moral agents necessitates a computa-
tional analogue to human awareness? If so, then we
should not be hopeful for a ready solution. Although
our personal awareness seems immediate and clear,
its root causes are nebulous and its contents are bare-
ly understood. But we are optimists. Perhaps there is
an informational component to awareness that suffi-
ciently supports accountability; a component that a
computational model could provide. We can then
ask the question that is central to this article. Is there
a way to develop intelligent, artificial agents that are
also moral agents — agents that have sufficient
autonomy to be held accountable? The answer, we
claim, is, “Yes,” and lies in operationalizing control.
What Is Control?
In the introduction, we identified three kinds of
agent-control pairings that we loosely associated
with thermostats, deer, and people. In this section,
we call these control0, control1, and control2, respec-
tively. Essentially all AI systems that act in the world
exhibit control0. The requirements at this level
include little more than a learned policy or a set of
production rules. Typically, policies like these are
learned with respect to hardwired principles such as
utility maximization or cost minimization. For the
purpose of contrasting these principles with our
norm-centered account of control2, we refer to them
as implicit control knowledge. If simultaneously
occurring, mutually exclusive, action requests are
even possible in these systems, the conflicts are
resolved through inflexible techniques like static rule-
ordering or a coin flip. In essence, such systems are
effectively a collection of stimulus-response map-
pings and the only basis upon which to call them
“agents” is in virtue of the fact that they act. More-
over, to say that such agents “select” actions is incor-
rect. Stimulus-response mappings generated by
implicit control knowledge determine what actions
such systems take.
Control1
Fewer AI systems implement techniques to support
control1. This level of control requires flexibility under
conditions of ignorance or indifference. Flexibility in
this sense is a matter of degree, but to illustrate the
idea, we look at how a particular cognitive system
addresses this requirement. Soar is a cognitive archi-
tecture for developing agents (Laird 2012). At its
heart, the architecture is a production system that
operates in cycles. At the risk of oversimplification,
during each cycle a Soar agent acquires percepts, elab-
orates these through its encoded knowledge, and uses
the subsequent state to select an operator for applica-
tion. Importantly, a Soar agent can apply only one
operator per cycle, and these operators are what initi-
ate action in the world. Occasionally, Soar’s (control0)
preference mechanisms cannot select among multi-
ple operators on a cycle. In this case the architecture
creates a substate in which it can carry out forward
simulation while continuing to monitor the environ-
ment. By using this mechanism to identify a preferred
course of action, the agent resolves its conflicts and
exhibits control1. Other AI systems may use different
mechanisms, but the important feature is the ability
to acquire or construct new, situation-specific infor-
mation that will influence the selection of one action
over another.
Control2
Control2 expands the flexibility of control1 by (1) mak-
ing control knowledge explicit and (2) providing a
means for agents to remain committed to goal pur-
suit in the face of distractions, temptations, and situ-
ational reappraisals.
Norms as Explicit Control Knowledge
Over the course of the discussion, we have empha-
sized the notion that maximization or minimization
principles used for agents exhibiting control0 are
norms or that they at least express something like
normative content. This aside, agents exhibiting con-
trol0 need never reason directly about such norms and
their applicability. These built-in norms are implicit
and determine how an agent acts rather than being
explicit and defeasible suggestions as to how the
agent ought to act. Expanding on our earlier descrip-
tion, norms are general principles or schemata cou-
pled with procedures for elaboration and interpreta-
tion that make them applicable to specific situations.
To guide behavior, norms must be recalled from
memory, instantiated to the situation, assessed for
applicability, and probed for exceptions, perhaps at
times through analogy (Forbus and Hinrichs 2017).
Because multiple conflicting norms may apply (for
example, do not steal and do not starve), an agent
may need to invoke strategies for resolving norm con-
flicts. These strategies may weigh norms based on
their provenance (for example, religious injunctions
may take precedence over workplace protocols) or
may suggest modifications to actions that lead to
acceptable behavior. As a loose example of norm-
based reasoning, consider how the hungry man
might align his actions with his norms:
Taking a sandwich is stealing because there is no per-
mission for the act.
Buying a sandwich confers permission to take it.
Other ways to gain permission are to ask or negotiate.
Therefore, negotiating to pay for the sandwich later
could enable taking the sandwich without stealing.
This case does not involve the control1 activity of
comparing competing actions or goals (for example,
Johnson et al. [2017]). Instead, this example illus-
trates how norms guide an agent to reflect on avail-
able actions or goals and to explore modifications
that produce norm-conforming behavior. Exhibiting
control2 does not always require this sort of creative
effort, but it does require the ability to apply general
standards of behavior to specific situations.
Commitment
The case of Kenneth Parks provides reasonable
grounds to distinguish between actions consciously
chosen by an agent and activity merely determined
by unconscious content. But an agent’s choice is only
as good as its commitment to follow through. Our
commitments to actions or goals, such as eating an
apple instead of a donut or maintaining a healthy
diet, can be fragile especially in the face of tempta-
tions, distractions, and situational reappraisal. Our
perceptions influence our actions and can take us off
course. This relationship between perception and
action is built into both Newell’s knowledge-level
agents and Russell and Norvig’s rational agents. For-
tunately, we can influence our perceptions by con-
trolling our actions. If a person turns her head, her
visual field changes. If she dons headphones, she
alters her soundscape. If she is committed to eating
healthily, she may move donuts out of sight or avoid
places where they are served. This is achievable when
an agent (1) has explicit causal knowledge about how
perception, mental states (for example, beliefs, obli-
gations, desires), and action are related and (2) can
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use this information to predict which actions might
reduce distractions or temptations. Some of these
actions might involve changing the nature of the
agent-environment interaction, such as closing a
window to prevent street-level noise from interrupt-
ing writing a paper. Other actions may be mental in
nature, like avoiding a distracting negative thought
by mentally rehearsing a song or the weekly shop-
ping list.
Taken together, the ability to choose a course of
action and to commit to its execution enables the
intentional behavior that some believe is necessary
for autonomous agents (Cohen and Levesque 1990).
For us, what is important is that when an agent is
instructed to carry out a task, it can choose to do oth-
erwise, as that is the ability that enables human-lev-
el agency. We claim that a single mechanism that
exists to some degree in control1 agents is central to
the capacities of choice and commitment in control2
agents. That mechanism is attention.
Attention and Control 
in Cognitive Systems
To reiterate, we have argued that intelligent agency is
intimately related to control and that a special kind
of control is required for human-level agency. We
also made a case that this form of control requires
both a mechanism of attention and knowledge that
can predict the mechanism’s effects. But what does
attention do in a cognitive system such that it might
enable control? In prior work, we have argued that
six particular desiderata, when jointly fulfilled by a
cognitive system, are sufficient for claiming that the
system has a rich capacity for attention, which (1) is
limiting and selective; (2) can be directed inward or
outward; (3) can be captured or intentionally direct-
ed; (4) asymmetrically biases mental processing; (5)
facilitates integrated mental processing; and (6) facil-
itates conscious access. Our earlier report justifies
these features (Bridewell and Bello 2016), and we take
them at face value throughout the rest of our discus-
sion.
To what degree do the three types of agents fulfill
these desiderata? A control0 agent is designed to not
need attention. These agents operate over a fixed set
of actions and state variables that are preselected and
rely on static preferences that determine which
actions take priority at any time. In contrast, a con-
trol1 agent has a mechanism of attention that enables
flexible goal pursuit. As we saw in the previous sec-
tion, a Soar agent can resolve impasses through for-
ward simulation, which shifts its attention to con-
flicting operators and away from the routine
application of actions. When this happens, attention
mediates the link between perception and action exe-
cution in an agent, enabling it to compare alterna-
tive actions based on their expected effects and their
relationship to that agent’s goal. In terms of the
desiderata, the mechanisms of impasse resolution
and hypothetical evaluation satisfy items 1–3. Specif-
ically, Soar (1) selectively elaborates operators (2) in
substates (3) in the case of impasses. This process
intervenes to break the perception-action link and
enables control in the face of ignorance or indiffer-
ence.
Although the abilities to interrupt the perception-
action cycle and to consider alternatives are neces-
sary aspects of attention, they are insufficient for
enabling control2. As it stands in Soar, nothing about
the substate reasoning process distinguishes rote
actions from actions open to reflection by an agent.
More directly, even on a thin, computational notion
of awareness that maps to levels of information avail-
ability, Soar agents lack awareness of any information
including any norms that guide their behavior.
Notably, such a minimal form of awareness is suffi-
cient to distinguish the two cases of homicide pre-
sented earlier, where opening both actions and
norms to deliberation would have let Kenneth Parks
evaluate and veto his aberrant behavior. So, even
though Soar agents satisfy items 1–3 in the desidera-
ta, they lack item 6, which is necessary to support
conscious choice.
Attention and Norms
We submit that no artificial agent can properly
choose unless alternatives are represented explicitly
in some analog to consciousness. Further, we con-
tend that explicit control knowledge given in the
form of norms is also represented in this analog. To
be clear, we do not disavow the possibility or the
potential efficacy of implicit, unconscious norms in
guiding behavior; such ideas stretch as far back as
Aristotle and form the foundation for entire classes
of ethical theories. Rather, we emphasize explicit
norms because they can be invoked as reasons, which
feature prominently in theories linking freedom of
the will, agency, control, and responsibility (Fischer
and Ravizza 1998). Furthermore, psychological data
suggests that norms are central to negotiating blame
and are thus a crucial ingredient for determining
accountability (Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe 2014).
What is the relationship between attention and
the application of norms? Attention must be direct-
ed toward both the interpretation of the norm and
the hypothetical consideration of an action within a
situation. At the surface level, norms and actions are
not necessarily comparable. Specifically, to compare
the base action of taking some item to a norm against
stealing, an agent must answer a variety of questions.
1. Does the norm apply to items of this type?
2. Does the norm apply to this specific item?
3. Is there explicit permission to take the item?
4. Is there implied permission to take the item?
5. What are the expected results of the action?
This list, which is not comprehensive, includes
top-down questions that elaborate the norm within
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a situation (1 and 2) and “bottom-up” questions that
position the action within a larger system of goal-dri-
ven and norm-guided behavior (3–5). Notably, a
question may require further direction of attention.
For instance, determining whether permission is
implied requires guided reasoning, which is impossi-
ble without sustained attention.
Attention and Commitment
Previously we noted that an agent’s choice is only as
good as its commitment to follow through. One of
the primary threats to commitment is distraction,
which presents a challenge to control1 agents whose
attention is directed only accidentally. These agents
rely on a fixed procedure for carrying out inference
and action selection, and that procedure’s input can-
not influence its operation in any way. This limita-
tion poses a problem for committing to actions and
goals because there are no means to avoid perceptions
or actions that would lead to broken commitments.
Suppose someone committed to eating healthily
decides to stop into the nearest cafe, which also sells
donuts. While there, she notices that she is hungry
and buys a donut because it is the only available
action to satisfy her hunger. If she had reflected on
her commitment she may have avoided the donut
shop altogether or possibly adopted an explicit goal
to not buy a donut, which would guard against an
impulse purchase. Knowing how particular actions
will influence perception and knowing how to
manipulate attention (for example, by adopting a
goal and maintaining it) enables a control2 agent to
successfully and durably commit to its choices.
Our task was to argue that attention is necessary for
control and to point out the details of that connec-
tion, but we are not the first to argue this point. In the
psychological and neuroscientific literature, we find
like minds in the research that investigates the con-
nection between attention and action (Allport 1987;
Hommel 2010; Wu 2011). Moreover, in AI the impor-
tance of control knowledge, or “strategies to guide
the use of knowledge” (Davis and Buchanan 1984),
was well appreciated when there was greater empha-
sis on what are now called cognitive systems. Moving
forward, emphasizing attention’s necessary place in
any account of agency will increase research interests
in this area and will ensure it a place of prominence
in any unified theory of the mind (Laird, Lebiere, and
Rosenbloom 2017).
Future Directions
We have gone some distance toward an account of
agency suitable to be explored computationally with-
in cognitive systems. Specifically, we have provided a
set of desiderata relating to attentional capacities,
along with some attendant representational assump-
tions that are required for the exertion of control. Our
account of control relies on three key elements: (1)
information parcelled into sets that distinguish
potentially conscious from unconscious content, (2)
an attentional mechanism that influences whether
content is consciously available, and (3) explicit con-
trol knowledge that can influence the attentional
mechanism.
However, many questions remain unanswered. As
we have developed an account of control, we have
presumed that something was doing the controlling.
Agency presupposes an agent, and we have not giv-
en any account of the first-personal qualities of
agency. When a particular student exercises agency
by raising her hand in class, what explains how she
knows it is her arm that is raised and that she did the
raising, especially when she is surrounded by other
students raising their hands? In general, we have not
exhaustively specified the conditions under which
the agent mentally represents itself as acting versus
situations where the agent acts in the absence of self-
representation. We have been silent about just how
actions under consideration might be made con-
sciously available, noting only the role of attention
in this process. Also missing is a description of how
considered actions turn into intentions, which lead
to action execution. Each of these topics deserves a
full treatment that we cannot provide here. Howev-
er, we are pursuing these concerns in our own
research on ARCADIA (Bridewell and Bello 2016) —
a system that provides functionality that meets the
six desiderata for attention and the three elements
critical for control2.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, a control2 agent is capable of choice
because it can attend to the relationship among
actions, goals, and norms and is capable of commit-
ment because it can direct attention to guard against
sources of distraction and temptation. The ability to
interpret the norms that guide behavior enables a
degree of choice not found in control0 or control1
agents. An agent may, depending on its immediate
assessment of a norm and available actions, choose to
act in a way that violates the norm. Taken together,
the ability to choose a course of action and to commit
to it enables the intentional behavior that some
believe is necessary for autonomous agents (Cohen
and Levesque 1990). For us, what is important is that
when an agent is instructed to carry out a task, it can
choose to do otherwise, as that is the ability that
enables human-level agency. With this position in
mind, we can clarify our initial claim and state, “there
is no human-level agency without control of atten-
tion.”
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Notes
1. We assume a broad view of sensing here that allows for
thoughts, memories, and other subjective features that
might be distracting.
2. It should go without saying that human agency, at least
typically, includes the capacity for moral agency.
3. The Supreme Court of Canada wrote in its judgment, “It
may be that some will regard the exoneration of an accused
through a defence of somnambulism as an impairment of
the credibility of our justice system. Those who hold this
view would also reject insane automatism as an excuse from
criminal responsibility. However, these views are contrary to
certain fundamental precepts of our criminal law: only those
who act voluntarily with the requisite intent should be punished
by criminal sanction” (italics added, quoted in Broughton et
al. 1994).
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